| Русский Русский | English English |
Главная Архив номеров
31 | 10 | 2020

DOI: 10.14489/vkit.2015.010.pp.055-060

Стюгин М. А.
(с. 55-60)

Аннотация. Рассмотрен канал скрытой передачи информации с отсутствующим строго определенным контейнером, в который заложена передаваемая информация. Проанализированы технические сложности его реализации и два способа их решения. Представлена техническая реализация абсолютно неразличимого канала для социальной сети Facebook.

Ключевые слова:  стеганография; стереотипные схемы; защита от исследования; защита на основе движущейся цели.


Styugin M. А.
(pp. 55-60)

Abstract. The present paper reviews the technology for establishing absolutely indiscernible data transfer channels. The fact of message transfer is only known to the sender and the recipient. Unlike the classical concept of a data transfer channel, in steganography there is no specific container in which transferred information is embedded. The main condition for an absolutely indiscernible data transfer channel is that the volume of information transferred through it should not be greater than the number of hypotheses, which a potential adversary needs to enumerate in order to detect the channel. Hence, even the mere task to detect such channels appears infeasible. Some original solutions, which allow solving technical difficulties in establishing such channels, are reviewed in this paper. One of those solutions is aliasing one channel with another. Eventually even after disclosing the channel in some way we can find information, which is ultimately not the information that had been transferred through the channel. That solution reveals new opportunities for misinformation in cyber wars. Another technical solution is constant modification of the channel’s structure and even modification of the rules for changing it. That is after some volume of data has been transferred the channel’s structure changes so significantly that it can be regarded as a new channel. That changing process is continuous. In case an eavesdropper somehow acquired the channel’s structure at a certain moment in time the next moment the channel will disappear from the eavesdropper as it shall change its structure. An absolutely indiscernible channel was implemented and tested in Facebook social network. It took around 8 hours to transmit the text of this paper. That channel in Facebook network was established by means of two chat bots. Information was transmitted using not the text messages but environment parameters. The parameters used were time delays between reading messages, between replies to messages, appearance of «typing» indicators, etc. Transmission speed of 33 bytes per minute was reached. In case of using other (non-timing) environment parameters a significant increase of a channel’s throughput capacity is possible.

Keywords: Steganography; Stereotyped patterns; Protection from research; Moving target defense.


М. А. Стюгин (Сибирский федеральный университет, Красноярск) E-mail: Этот e-mail адрес защищен от спам-ботов, для его просмотра у Вас должен быть включен Javascript  


 M. А. Styugin (Siberian Federal University, Krasnoyarsk) E-mail: Этот e-mail адрес защищен от спам-ботов, для его просмотра у Вас должен быть включен Javascript


1. Cachin C. An Information-Theoretic Model for Stega-nography // Proceeding of the Workshop on Information Hiding. 1998. V. 192. Р. 41 – 56.
2. Techniques for Data Hiding / Bender W. et al. // IBM System Journal. 1996. V. 35. Р. 13 – 24.
3. Modeling the Security of Steganographic Systems / Zollner J. et al. // Proceeding of the Workshop on Information Hiding. 1998. V. 1525. Р. 123 – 132.
4. Styugin М. Protection Against System Research // Cybernet-ics and System. 2014. V. 45(4). Р. 362 – 372.
5. Morran M., Weir G. R. S. An Approach to Textual Stega-nography // Communications in Computer and Information Science. 2010. V. 92. Р. 48 – 54.
6. Shirali-Shahreza M. Text Steganography by Changing Words Spelling // 10th Intern. Conf. on Advanced Communication Technolo-gy, ICACT 2008. 17-20 February 2008, Phoenix Park, Korea. 2008. V. 3. Р. 1912 – 1913.
7. Linguistic Steganalysis Using the Features Derived from Synonym Frequency / Xiang L. et al. // Multimedia Tools and Applica-tions. 2014. V. 71. (August). Р. 1893 – 1911.
8. Ogilvie R., Weir G. R. S. Genre-based Information Hiding // Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, LNICST. 2012. V. 99. Р. 104 – 111.
9. The Adam and Ava Paradox / М. Kraft et al. // 8th Intern. Conf. on Information Warfare and Security (ICIW 2013). Regis Uni-versity, Denver, Colorado, USA. 25 – 26 March, 2013. Р. 275 – 283.
10. Moving Target Defense: Creating Asymmetric Uncertainty for Cyber Threats / Jajodia S. et al. / Advances in Information Security. 2011. 184 p.


1. Cachin C. (1998) An information-theoretic model for stega-nography. Proceeding of the Workshop on Information Hiding. 192, pp. 41-56.
2. Bender W. et al. (1996). Techniques for data hiding. IBM System Journal, 35, pp. 13-24.
3. Zollner J. et al. (1998). Modeling the security of steganographic systems. Proceeding of the Workshop on Information Hiding. 1525, pp. 123-132.
4. Styugin М. (2014). Protection against system research. Cybernetics and System, 45(4), pp. 362-372.
5. Morran M., Weir G. R. S. (2010). An approach to textual stega¬nography. Communications in Computer and Information Sci-ence. 92, pp. 48-54. doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-15717-2_6
6. Shirali-Shahreza M. (2008). Text steganography by changing words spelling. International Conference on Advanced Communication Technology, ICACT, Vol. 3. Article Number 4494159, pp. 1912-1913.
7. Xiang L. et al. (2014). Linguistic steganalysis using the fea-tures derived from synonym frequency. Multimedia Tools and Applications. 71, pp. 1893-1911. doi: 10.1007/s11042-012-1313-8
8. Ogilvie R., Weir G. R. S. (2012). Genre-based information hiding. Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, LNICST, Vol. 99, pp. 104-111. doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-33448-1_15.
9. Kraft М. et al. (2013). The Adam and Ava Paradox. 8th International Conference on Information Warfare and Security, ICIW, pp. 275-283.
10. Jajodia S. et al. (2011). Moving target defense: creating asymmetric uncertainty for cyber threats. Advances in Information Security.


Статью можно приобрести в электронном виде (PDF формат).

Стоимость статьи 350 руб. (в том числе НДС 18%). После оформления заказа, в течение нескольких дней, на указанный вами e-mail придут счет и квитанция для оплаты в банке.

После поступления денег на счет издательства, вам будет выслан электронный вариант статьи.

Для заказа статьи заполните форму:




This article  is available in electronic format (PDF).

The cost of a single article is 350 rubles. (including VAT 18%). After you place an order within a few days, you will receive following documents to your specified e-mail: account on payment and receipt to pay in the bank.

After depositing your payment on our bank account we send you file of the article by e-mail.

To order articles please fill out the form below:











Rambler's Top100 Яндекс цитирования